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Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve
sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth.
Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks; gg: Greece is Greece) and their synonym interceptions (GH:
Greeks are Hellenes; gh: Greece is Hellas) share factual content (extrasentential reality asserted). Semantic
(cognitive) content is (identifiable with) factual content in synthetic predications, but not logical sentences
and interceptions. Putnam's Postulate (Logical form has semantic import) entails interception
nonsynonymy. Syntax and vocabulary explain only the factual content of synthetic predications;
extrasentential reality explains their truth. Construction of logical factual content explains logical necessity.
Terms retain objectual reference, but logical syntax preempts their function (and thereby function of
extrasentential reality) in explaining truth. Grasping the facts GG/gg assert entails understanding this.
Understanding what GH states requires some recognition that GH must be true just because GmH
("Greeks" means Hellenes), and GmH ("Greeks" means what "Hellenes" means) state an empirical fact.
GH (but not GG) is standardly used to express that fact.
Church's Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences ("Ex" means Ex), and QTi sentences (p≡it is true that
p≡"p" is true) are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Intercepting QMi creates empirical QM
contingencies ("Ex" means Ey). Synonymy turns semantic contingencies (GmH/GmH) into metalogical
(GmG/GmG) and lexical (GH) necessities. That transformation is syntactic, via the syntactic duality of
definite descriptions. GmH is a contingent copredication, and a lexically necessary referential identity with
rigidly codesignating indexicals.
Metalogical sentences may be about expressional matter or what it expresses (meaning,
proposition). GG (Griechen sind Griechen) has GG's semantic content, but the referent expression
switches. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing. Metalogically, referents
are identified with intrasentential replica. Extrasentential identifications are metalogically irrelevant.
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1. Interception Nonsynonymy.    The Synonym Substitution Principle says that synonymous words replace
each other in a sentence without affecting its meaning. The Principle must be right about most instances,
but what of the unique case of intercepting: nonuniform substituting of a term pivotal in the truth securing
syntax of a logical truth?i Is GG synonymous with its synomic interception, GH?
GG: Greeks are Greeks
GH: Greeks are Hellenes
And, if the meaning of a name is its reference, are gg and gh synonymous:
gg: Greece is Greece
gh: Greece is Hellas?ii
   Hilary Putnam's [1981] assertion of the synonymy of interceptions is clear and succinct:
    ...the interchangeability of 'bachelor' and 'male adult human being who has never been married' ...
explains why 'all bachelors are unmarried' may be regarded as synonymous with 'all male adult
humans who have never been married are unmarried'. ... the truth of the latter statement ...is...
presupposed.iii
This assumption of interception synonymy has shaped Analytical thought since Locke trashed as trifling the
essential truths ancient genius was after. For the central, startling thesis of his Essay, that definitional truths
are trivial self-identities, Locke is the Kepler of Kant's Copernican revolution.iv Puzzles of interception
synonymy trigger Frege's 'Sinn und Bedeutung', and plague Linguistic Philosophy in paradoxes of analysis
and mystifying, multipurpose arguments like Moore's open question, Gödel's slingshot, and Church's
Translation Test.
Interception synonymy is well nigh never doubted,v and obviously mythical. Putnam [1954]
himself, a quarter century prior, pronounced the plain fact of our sense of our own speech: '"All Greeks are
2Greeks" and "All Greeks are Hellenes" do not feel quite like synonyms.'vi
The explanation of this linguistic intuition is near plain as the datum. Pairs like GG-GH don't
sound alike because they aren't used alike. They aren't freely interchangeable because they don't say or
mean the same. Synomic interceptions are most naturally used to explain the meaning of their own terms, in
place of QM sentences, like:
GmHvii: 'Greeks' means Hellenes
and QMQ sentences, like:
GmH: 'Greeks' means what 'Hellenes' means.
We do not use GH to say what we say with GmG or GmG.
GmG: 'Greeks' means Greeks
GmG: What 'Greeks' means is what 'Greeks' means.
And we cannot use GG to say what we use GmH or GmH to say. Nor do we standardly use GG where we
use GmG and GmG.
Yet, without a drop of empirical data to fuel it, despite all our experience of language, Empiricism
plausibly proceeds on the premise of interception synonymy. Synomic interceptions flat out fail every test
of sameness of meaning that motivates translators, lexicographers and linguists, all but the one criterion
logicians have cared about: their factual content is identical. The same objects are denoted, the same
properties predicated, the same extrasentential, multiexpressible reality asserted. Whatever be GG's factual
content, whatever it says objectually, about the multiexpressible world of fact outside itself, is just what all
its translations, like:
GG: Griechen sind Griechen,viii
say, and what all of all their synomic interceptions objectually say. Their truth conditions are identical.
Elsewhere, (cognitive, informational) synonymy, sameness of semantic content is sameness of factual
content. Why should it — how could it — be otherwise with truths due to syntax and truths due to
semantics? GH's (cognitive) meaning cannot differ from GG/GG's unless GH somehow implies some fact
not implied by the fact it states. What could that be?
32. History.     Putnam [1954] provided the first lines of an argument for interception nonsynonymy from
elemental principles of linguistic theory relating syntax to semantics. Simply stated: syntax determines
sentence meaning apart from word meanings, and interceptions lack the truth securing syntax of logical
sentences, so interceptions cannot say what their logical correlates say.
  Putnam was prompted by Mates' noticing nonequivalence in synomic interceptions of belief
reports.ix Putnam's Postulate, that logical form has semantic content, has been cited repeatedly, often
obliquely, rarely approvingly, and more rarely with any of all that cries out for clarification. From Church'sx
and Sellars'xi replies onward, analysis gets skewed by staring at intensional context subbings.xii Putnam's
Postulate is about logical syntax per se. Its implications for intensionality conundra are confirmational
corollaries of its claim about elemental, referentially transparent, extensional logical truth. Church, Sellars,
all critics sail by the syntactic iceberg while ridiculing its tips on intensionality with assumptions of
intuitive semantics.xiii
This sorry tale's saddest chapter is the abandonment of Putnam's brainchild by its begetter. Instead
of criticizing its critics, we see him renouncing it in assorted, often celebrated assertions.xiv Putnam is as
acute as they come, and blessedly unabashed about changing his mind now and again, but he has seemed
obliviously silent about his ambivalence over interception synonymy.
Putnam has shown us the unsettled condition we're all in when we leave unresolved this antinomy
at the center of synonymy. Interception nonsynonymy is an empirical certainty. It's also a necessity entailed
by Putnam's Postulate, an a priori certainty for those who much understand what it says. But it bangs into
all that beckons us to think of semantic content as factual content, and to feel certain that interception
nonsynonymy is a priori impossible. This collision of hardpan principles lies at the nexus of our
conceptions of meaning and logic. We're bound to flounder till we find some understanding of the why,
what and how of interception nonsynonymy.
3. Synonymy vs Analysis.     Defenses of interception synonymy derive mainly from Church's Translation
Test of semantic equivalence.xv The Test presumes that translation preserves meaning, so sentences are
inequivalent if their translations are. Churchian translations are essentially synonym substitutions. A
4translating sentence is to retain the original syntax, and alter only morphemically by synonym subbing.
The Test rests on the Principle so it cannot supply support. Worse, the Principle evidently entails
the Test's futility. Any disparity apparent only under translation, not in the original, should be a discrepancy
in and of the translation. Where the Principle applies, translating should test only our patience.xvi
Translations are not analyses. Churchian translating brings bilinguals no enlightenment. Analyses
can be revelations, a fact smacking little of paradox absent any mistaking of synonymy for analysis. 
Locke recognized that analyses aren't synonymies.xvii He wouldn't waste pages to prove GH and its
ilk 'trifling'. Alas, Locke led legions to say: Essentialist analyses are trifles because our name for a property,
the analyzandum, is just an abbreviation of the analyzans. Actually, abbreviation paradigms, like:
ET: An ETA is an estimated time of arrival,
are trifling because they're synomic truths, not essentialist analyses.
Analyses, like Locke's 'Lead is a metal', are transnotational truths, fully translatable, (apparently)
necessary truths, knowable a priori. Synomic truths (GH, gh, ET) express internotational relations,
consequences of contingent notational equivalences, knowable only a posteriori. They are materially,
morphemically specific, inexpressible without reusing some pivotal term (or etymological cognate.)xviii
'Bachelor' and its abbreviation 'B' predicate a property without describing it. Putnam's [1981]
analysans, 'male adult human being who has never been married', describes the property; it states the
property's essential features. There can be no question whether 'bachelor' correctly describes the property 'B'
predicates. Whether Putnam's analysans correctly describes the property 'bachelor' predicates can, logically,
grammatically, be a question, be put in question.xix
4.  Composition vs Proof.     Interception nonsynonymy can seem incredible by seeming incompatible with
the 'compositionality' of sentence meaning.xx That appearance may evidence only an obtuseness about the
semantic import of a distinctive syntactic component of logical sentences.xxi
Putnam's [1981] compositional picture says a synomic interception is the resultant of intercepting,
that it presupposes a logical truth. Yet, elsewhere no natural sense attaches to a claim that a sentence
('Socrates is a Greek') is a resultant of or presupposes some synonymous sentence ('Socrates is an Hellene').
5GH's syntax is that of:
GM: Greeks are mortal
GP:  Greeks are philosophers.
Linguistic theories don't suggest that the meaning of such empirical claims is a resultant of intercepting a
presupposed GG, so why suppose it of GH? Formally, we could as well regard GG a substitution resultant
presupposing GH or GM or GP.
Referential and predicational self-identities (b=b, (x)(Fx→Fx)) are axiomatic in formal systems of
proof. That does not entail their being cognitive or conceptual primitives. Cognitive processing of meaning
probably proceeds by reverse interception, from interceptions to logical sentences. Toddlers aren't taught
self-identities before pronouncings of alter-identities (b=c, (x)(Fx→Gx)). How could they be? That would
be like imparting understanding of multiplication and division by first explaining multiplying and dividing
by 1.
Synomic sentences may look like resultants of intercepting logical sentences because synomic
interceptions of complex logical sentences are provable only by proving the logical truth and then
intercepting it. Our reasoning must run on the rails of logical syntax, and then jump the rail, by synonym
subbing, to another syntactic track. This order of proof is epistemic, not ontic, semantic, alethic or
compositional. Only our knowledge of the conclusion is explained by the reasoning. Its meaning and truth
need something more.
The atomic, two-termed GH is no more proven by intercepting GG than reverse intercepting GH
proves atomic GG. Such syntactically basic synomic and logical truths are logically independent. If
synonymy doesn't explain GH's necessity directly, without intercepting GG, the interception would be an
unwarrantable inference.xxii
5. Term Recurrence.     A logical sentence and its interceptions are syntactically divergent completions of
a shared syntactic frame.xxiii Completing the frame:
Greeks are ______
with 'Greeks' yields GG, a structure syntactically unlike any other closure of that open sentence. GM, GP
6and GH differ in meaning just because 'mortals', 'philosophers' and 'Hellenes' do. The GH-GG
nonsynonymy isn't explainable by the meanings of 'Hellenes' and 'Greeks are ___' versus the meanings of
'Greeks' and 'Greeks are ___', for there is no difference there.
The terms of logical and synomic sentences objectually designate and predicate as elsewhere.
Otherwise, they couldn't be premises connecting synthetic predications: GH and HM ('Hellenes are mortal')
couldn't be major and minor premises for GM. GG's factual content is constructed from the same open
sentence and term meanings as GH. The nonsynonymy of GG-GH is in the syntax of term recurrence and
its absence. 
Logic texts teach that no conclusion is validly deduced unless its pivotal terms appear in its
premise(s). That's because term (and sentence) recurrence is the sole strictly syntactic device securing
sameness of sense and denotation in a sentence or sentence sequence. Any other device is an extrasyntactic,
semantic convention peculiar to the notation.xxiv This requirement for logical validity, the syntactic truth of
a conditional, is a requirement for syntactic truths formed from any connective, and for syntactic truth as
such.
Logical form is unique even among other truths often called formal. Putnam [1954] 'put aside as
irrelevant' the Synonym Substitution Principle's 'formal similarity to the "equals may be substituted for
equals"' of mathematics. Actually, the formal dissimilarity is key to interception nonsynonymy.
Mathematical truth is not syntactic. Uniform subbing of nonsynonyms endangers mathematical truth.
Meanwhile, synonym subbings like '14-6=2+6' and '14-6=2+IV' are synonymous. Term recurrence is
essential for syntactic truth, and irrelevant to mathematical truth.xxv
6. Meaning as Explanation.     Logical truths survive all uniform term substitutions. Their term references
and predications, though objectual, are idle. The role of term sense and denotation — and thus the role of
the world — in the explanation of truth is preempted by term recurrence in logical sentences. In synomic
truths, the explanatory role of extrasentential reality is preempted by the coincident meaning of disparate
terms.
GM's meaning is identifiable with its factual content because its syntax and word meanings fix only
7the factual condition GM states, without fixing whether GM states a fact. GM's truth is explained by the
multiexpressible, extrasentential reality that Greeks are mortal.
The necessity in GG and GH is explained by the construction of their factual content, not by an
extrasentential reality. A necessity is a truth in all worlds. More than that, a truth's necessity is an
explanation of its being a truth in all worlds. GG's logical necessity is in its multirealizable, translanguage
structure. GH's necessity is lexical, an artifact of GmH/GmH's truth, the QM/QMQ contingency explaining
GH.
GH doesn't state GmH. GmH doesn't state or describe GH's factual content. GmH states the fact of
synonymy that explains GH's factual content, what it is and why GH has it, and why it is necessary. So too,
gh is necessitated solely by the coreference of its names, not a bit by the referent's extrasentential features.
GH is misunderstood without some understanding of the vacuity of its factual content. You don't get what
GH says, you cannot construct or explain its content, without some sensing that its truth is all a matter of
word meanings, of alternative terms for the same property. So GH's meaning is expressible and identifiable
as GmH. 
GG's meaning isn't expressed by GmG or anything like a lexical definition. Its term's meaning only
specifies the objectual referent of GG's factual content, which distinguishes GG from nonsynonymous self-
identities, like gg. The semantic import of GG's term recurrence is in the irrelevance of its term's meaning to
its necessity.
Objectually, GG is no more about its syntax than GH is about its terms. Sentences having logical
form, like GG and:
H: If she's a fretter and fretters are foolish, she's foolish
are not sentences about logical form, like:
A: The conjunction of her being a fretter and fretters' being foolish implies that she's foolish.
A is true, not by its own syntax, but because, through its terms' meanings, it says that sentences having H's
form are ipso facto true.xxvi
H expresses the form it exhibits, but not by meaning A as GH means GmH. Logical form is not semantic or
8representational in the sense of referring to or meaning something outside the enformed sentence. Unlike
GH's semantic relations, GG's and H's truth securing structures are displayed, embodied in duplications
within the sentential matter. Logical form shows itself. It doesn't say itself or something else. Term
recurrence is an intrasentential relation with intrasentential import.
We don't understand a complex logical sentence, or any logical sentence, until we realize it is one,
and not a synthetic predication. You categorially misconstrue what it says, you cannot construct its content,
without some recognition (however dim) that its truth is fixed by syntax. That explanation is 'in' a logical
sentence's meaning. When we listen to GG and H as sentences of logic, when we hear their vacuity, we hear
their symbols capturing certainty by their sameness instead of their content.xxvii
     Sentence meaning fixes factual content, and thereby method of verification. Synthetic predications are
justified, not by features of the expressional matter, but by extrasentential facts, cognized by perception,
ratiocination, divine revelation or whatever. Truth explained by abstract, translanguage syntax is cognizable
a priori. Synomic truth is uncognizable and incomprehensible without a posteriori cognition of semantic
contingencies. Interception realigns inferential relations with all other sentences.
7. Metalogical Translation.     Church's Test has been a bulwark of interception synonymy by assuming it.
The Test turns on translating metalogical QMi sentences with synomic interceptions, extralogical (non-
QMi) QM sentences:
QM : ExmEy: 'Ex' means (says, designates, etc.) Eyxxviii
QMi: ExmEx: 'Ex' means Ex.
The Test says BmB intertranslates BmB, whereas BmB intertranslates BmB.
B: Blood is red 
B: Blut ist rot
BmB: 'Blood is red' says that blood is red
BmB: 'Blood is red' heißt daß Blut ist rot
BmB: 'Blut ist rot' heißt daß Blut ist rot
BmB: 'Blut ist rot' says that blood is red.
9The core argument is compelling. All four QM sentences predicate the same property, saying that blood is
red. BmB and BmB predicate it of sentence B; BmB and BmB predicate it of B. BmB-B  mB and BmB-
BmB are the only pairs sharing factual content, so they are the only synonyms. And since the mixed
language sentences express empirical contingencies, their QMi synonyms must too. Q.E.D.
8. Explaining Test Results.     That reasoning commands respect, but not assent. What's at work is no quirk
of subbing intraquotationally (which Church deems the Principle's sole exception). That misplaces the
muddle. Notwithstanding any factual content switch, all four QM sentences are mutual semantic
entailments, interderivable by synonym subbing, either intra- or extraquotational.xxix All four substitutional
possibilities transmit truth. More generally, all synomic interceptions of a QMi sentence or its QMi
translations are extralogical QM sentences entailing each other by contingent semantic facts.xxx
Meanwhile, whether substitution is intraquotation (BmB-BmB; BmB-BmB), affecting factual
content, or extraquotation (BmB-BmB; BmB-BmB), maintaining factual content, synomic intercepting
transforms a QMi tautology into a QM report of a notational accident. In object level intercepting (GG-
GH), term synonymy is a surrogate for syntax, securing necessary coextension. Through metalogical
intercepting (GmG-GmH), synonym subbing leads from a logical necessity to a semantic contingency that
explains a lexical necessity (GH).
If GH's semantic content were the translanguage factual content of GG and GH, GH could not
mean (say, imply) GmH. Actually, while the first two of the following are blatantly false, if the third be
false it ain't blatant.
GHm(GmG): *'Greeks are Hellenes' says/means 'Greeks' means Greeks
GGm(GmH): *'Greeks are Greeks' says/means 'Greeks' means Hellenes.
GHm(GmH): 'Greeks are Hellenes' says/means 'Greeks' means Hellenes.
None but pedants protests the last. More to the point and less tendentious, intercepting QMi sentences
about logical sentences transforms a logical necessity (GGmGG) into a logical impossibility (GGmGH,
HGmGG):
GGmGG: 'Greeks are Greeks' means Greeks are Greeks
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GGmGH: *'Greeks are Greeks' means Greeks are Hellenes
HGmGG: *'Hellenes are Greeks' means Greeks are Greeks.
As a matter of logic, interceptions can't match the meaning of logical truths.
Consequently, synomic intercepting in intensional contexts may turn a certainty like:
Church would qualmlessly tell children that the necessity of Greeks being Greeks is a matter of 
pure logic alone
into a dubiety:
Church would qualmlessly tell children that the necessity of Greeks being Hellenes is a matter of 
pure logic alone.
Synonymies are contingencies, and so is knowledge of them, so their denial is not illogical or irrational.
Thus the inequivalence of:
EGM: Ed affirms (says or thinks) that Greeks are mortal
EHM: Ed affirms that Hellenes are mortal.
While interchangeable as statements of the factual content Ed affirms, EGM and EHM ascribe to Ed
logically independent understandings of the fact he affirms, with differing explanatory and predictive
import for Ed's behavior. Inferences between EGM and EHM assume Ed's affirming GH. 
9. Test Challenges.     Churchian arguments for interception synonymy presuppose and cannot prove the
insignificance of term recurrence in logic. They avoid question begging by arguing ad absurdum, exposing
paradoxical implications of interception nonsynonymy and defying us to make sense of apparent
impossibilities.
For example, it seems impossible for GmG to be logically necessary, since, certainly, GmG and
GmH have identical factual content, and GmH states an empirical contingency. Also, certainly, the
logically necessary self-identity GmG and contingent GmH predicate logically independent properties of
logically independent objects. How could they be mutually entailing?
These challenges are formidable, but paradoxical platitudes populating this region needn't be
parented by interception nonsynonymy. Surely, the contingency, GmH, explains the necessity of GH. But
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how, when, surely, Greeks would be Hellenes (GH would be true) even if our words 'Greeks' and 'Hellenes'
had never existed (GmH had been false)?
10. Metalogic of Truth.     Let's start with the Church Test's attack on the metalogical principle, QTi, and
instances, like Bti:
QTi: p≡it is true that p≡'p' is true
QTi: p≡pt≡pt
Bti: B≡Bt≡Bt
Bt: It is true that blood is red
Bt: 'Blood is red' is true.
B and Bt are mutually entailing. They intertranslate B and Bt:
Bt: Dass Blut ist rot ist wahr.
Bt-Bt state one fact; Bt-Bt state another: 
Bt: 'Blood is red' ist wahr
Bt: 'Blut ist rot' ist wahr
Bt: 'Blut ist rot' is true.
The two facts are logically independent. Bt's synonym, Bt, has no logical entailment with B or Bt. So Bt has
none. Q.E.D.
This assumes interception synonymy: viz., since Bt translates Bt in extralogical contexts, it does so
when Bt is a pivotal component of a logical truth like Bti, where such translation is synomic intercepting.xxxi
11. Logical Truth of QMi.     QTi gets rejected as a metalogical principle partially defining truth, because
QTi is a corollary of QMi (and p≡pt), and the Test rejects QMi as a metalogical principle partially defining
meaning. Churchians say that, to license enquotation and disquotation between Bt and Bt, a contingent
BmB must be premised, like:
BemB: (The English sentence) 'Blood is red' says blood is red.xxxii
However, the reasoning requiring that premise then calls for another:
(Be mB)em(BemB): 'Blood is red' (in English) says blood is red (in English) says 
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 'Blood is red' (in English) says blood is red
which calls for:
[(Be mB)em(BemB)]em[(Be mB)em(BemB)],
and so on. Denying QMi's logical character misconceives its inferential role in the way Lewis Carroll
explained with the object level modus ponens. MP and QMT
MP: p(p→q)→q
QMT: pmp≡(pt≡pt)
are inference schemata whose instantiations state valid inferences, since these conditionals are true
whatever their component sentences mean.
12. Intrasentential Indexing.     Church rejected QMi as a schema of logic comparable to 'p→p', 'x=x', '(x)
(Fx≡Fx)'. He assumed the referent for the BmB quotation is indexed by some explicit or implicit qualifier
like: 'the English sentence'.xxxiii So construed, BmB and Bti are extralogical, for truth isn't secured
syntactically. Syntax secures metalogical truth only if some self-referential indexer ties the quotation to its
intrasentential replica. An indexer something like:
[itlotu]: in the language of this utterance.
Translation must transmit the structure that makes a sentence (meta)logical. Other sentences can contain
self-referenced quotations; metalogical truths must.
Intrasentential indexing enforces intraquotation translation (BmB-BmB). Metalogical translation
replicates, not the original enquoted matter, but the self-referenced intrasentential twin, because metalogical
truth is necessitated by intrasentential relations, not by an extrasentential referent.
13. Metalogical Subjects.     Metalogical sentences may be about either an expression or the
multiexpressible content expressed, a meaning or proposition. In:
Bpt: The proposition, 'Blood is red', is true
the indexer, 'proposition', demands intraquotation translation (Bt-Bt) to secure both objectual reference to
content and metalogical syntax. Quotation replication (Bt-Bt) forces reference to the matter and eliminates
metalogical syntax in translations of Bti.xxxiv Similarly, the referent subject of:
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GmG: The meaning of 'Greeks' is Greeks
is also the meaning of 'Griechen', so GmG shares metalogical syntax and factual content with:
GmG: Der Sinn von 'Griechen' ist Griechen.
Metalogical truths about meanings and propositions are fully multiexpressible because their subjects are.
Metalogic about matter is another matter. When reading Bt as:
Bst: The sentence, 'Blood is red', is true,
translating the tripartite equivalence Bsti as Bsti sacrifices objectual reference to save metalogical syntax.
Metalogical content construction identifies quotational referents intrasententially. Bsti and Bsti intertranslate
since both assert that:
Blood is red ≡ it is true that blood is red ≡ 'the sentence in this utterance that says blood is red' is
true.
Non-self-referential identifications of the referent sentence by its properties outside Bti are irrelevant to
Bti's metalogical necessity.
Similarly, objectual factual content shifts between:
GmG: (Our word) 'Greeks' means Greeks
GmG: (Unser Wort) 'Griechen' bedeutet Griechen,
when each sentence describes an expression (attributes to a word a semantic property: meaning Greeks),
instead of identifying what is expressed. Matter-referring QMi sentences are tautologous, since quotational
referent identification is controlled intrasententially. GmG and GmG state a single metalogical truth:
'The word in this utterance that means Greeks' means Greeks.
14. Identifying Metalogical Fact.     Church takes BmB to be BemB, a contingency about matter translated
by BemB. His non-self-referential empirical contingencies are synomic interceptions of BmB indexed
[itlotu]. All three sentences predicate the same semantic property of the same matter. Logical necessity lies
not in the fact, but in the form the fact is cast in.
Necessarily, I speak the language I speak. As it happens, I'm speaking English, but whether I am or
believe I am is immaterial. In any case, if I say 'Blood is red' to say blood is red, my utterance, 'Blood is red',
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says blood is red. I may thereby express a belief that blood is red. Whether I hold that belief is immaterial.
In any case, I express my incorrigible QMi belief that my utterance, 'Blood is red' [itlotu], says blood is red.
Whoever says 'p' to say p rightly says 'p' says p, because whoever says 'p' to say p says 'p' says p. If the
meaning of my 'Blood is red' [itlotu] is the meaning of that expression in your idiolect, or in standard
English, or the meaning of 'Blut ist rot' in German, then my BmB mutually entails BemB and BemB, in the
sense that my seeing Greece mutually entails my visually perceiving Hellas. 
15. Modal Relativism.   Concepts of a proposition fluctuate between factual and semantic content. If
propositional content is just factual content, then GG, GG, GH, and GG state (and thereby are) one
proposition. If propositional content is semantic, if the test for propositional identity is translation, not truth
conditions, then intertranslating GG-GG state one truth, GH states another, and GG a third. While true in
all worlds together with GG-GG, GH's matter is integral to its meaning, and GG's to its, whereas GG-GG's
truth is asserted with any semantically equivalent term.
Like our lexical necessities, our matter-referring metalogical sentences say something objectual
that monolingual foreigners cannot say or think or mean. Outsiders can see and assert the empirical fact that
we express necessities with our synomic and matter-referring metalogical sentences. Aliens cannot voice,
feel or be confined by the shackles in our speech.
Matter-referring metalogical meaning is like that of other logical and metalogical sentences. They
all translate through synonymous terms since their truth is necessitated by multiembodiable structure,
whatever their term matter means. That synonymy is compromised when the meaning of the quotational
matter is its metalogical reference to itself. In matter-referring metalogical truth, the meaning of the
sentence gets reexpressed with matter predicating the same semantic property of its self-referencing matter.
Only the self-referent subject matter shifts as the objectually self-referencing subject matter shifts.
Objectual reference in synomic truth is equally impotent to explain necessity, but here the matter
isn't self-referential so factual content is detachable and reexpressible. But the sense of the lexical necessity
is expressible only with its term matter, for it is explainable solely by that matter's synonymy, not its
multirealizable structure nor any other synonymy. 
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While inhabiting the same objectual, logical world, we communicate from within and about private
metalogical worlds. The necessities of matter's semantic properties (meaning,truth) are explained by and are
relative to that matter's syntactic relations within its QMi and QTi sentences.
Otherwise Church's Test will make a mess of modality. It says that p (Necessarily, p) and pt
(Necessarily, it is true that p) mutually entail each other but not pt (Necessarily, 'p' is true). Whatever the
'p', pt tests false when its quotation indexer imports an empirical touch that transforms a princely
necessity into a contingent frog. When QMi, and thus QTi, sentences are extralogical, then all necessities
(logical, lexical, metalogical, mathematical, etc.) suffer the same degradation. Without some reading
wherein pt mutually entails p and pt, little sense is left in any modal sentence. Like truth, necessity
and possibility attach to a proposition only by attaching to an expression of it, by (and with) which it is
identifiable.
16. Modal Muddles.     The syntactic duality of definite descriptions dissolves much of the murk
surrounding intermodal explanation: how semantic contingencies explain necessities. 
QMQ sentences can be cast in the familiar form for identities, Term is Term:
GmH: The meaning of 'Greeks' is the meaning of 'Hellenes' 
gmh: What 'Greece' means is what 'Hellas' means.
QMQ's terms are definite descriptions. Each identifies and designates an individual (a meaning) by
describing and identifying a property (being the meaning of 'Ex') whose unique possession identifies the
individual. Whether another quotational descriptive designates that referent is an empirical contingency. So
QMQ sentences are contingent empirical copredications. A QMQ empirical fact is multiexpressible, for its
referents are variously identifiable. A QMQ copredication is fit to explain by syntax only its intralanguage
relations, with all quotations indexed [itlotu]. The predicational identity GmH explains GmH, HmG, and
two untranslatable lexical necessities, objectual GH and referential GmH.
By its structure a definite description is also an indexical rigidly designating the object actually
identified predicatively.xxxv So, GmH is also a referential identity, lexically necessary:
The meaning of our word, 'Greeks'=the meaning of our word, 'Hellenes'.
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With all quotations [itlotu], these indexicals corefer to what, as copredicates, they codescribe. As with GH,
the fact copredicational GmH states appears in coindexical GmH's semantic content, not in its factual
content. GmH's copredicational contingency is what those lexically necessary truths, each in its own way,
mean. It is their empirical import, what their necessity tells us about our world.
Our semantic predicate, 'the meaning of our word "Greeks"', is undefined if its subordinate
expression predicate, 'our word, "Greeks"', is referenceless. Copredicational GmH wouldn't be true if our
world were 'Greeks'-less or 'Hellenes'-less. As things are, in fact, our GmH states an empirical fact. So the
terms of our GmH do rigidly codesignate an individual, a meaning present in 'Greeks'-less and 'Hellenes'-
less, but 'Griechen'-ful worlds. As things are, [itlotu], we say, objectually and truly:
HYP: Greeks would be Hellenes even if our words, 'Greeks', 'Hellenes', did not mean what they 
now do.
Only the counterfactual HYP is assertible. Its realization is a metalogical impossibility inconsistent with
QMi:
CAT: Greeks would be Hellenes even though 'Greeks' [itlotu] does not mean Greeks
and 'Hellenes' [itlotu] does not mean Hellenes.
CAT is not self-contradictory, but each categorical conjunct entails the senselessness of the subjunctive.
Our lexical and metalogical necessities are as real as the way we are using our words.
Unlike GmH, both copredicational and coreferential GmG are self-identities. Like GmH, GmG is
contingent as a singular predication, the expression predicate, 'our word "Greeks"', as subject term and the
semantic predicate, 'means what our word "Hellenes"', means. Like GmH, empirical GmG states the
empirical import of the objectual logical necessity, GG, and of the metalogical necessities, copredicational
and coreferential GmG.xxxvi
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